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CYBERWARFARE AND THE USE OF FORCE 
GIVING RISE TO THE RIGHT OF  
SELF-DEFENSE 
Matthew Hoisington*
Abstract: Cyberwarfare represents a novel weapon that has the potential 
to alter the way state and non-state actors conduct modern war. The 
unique nature of the threat and the ability for cyberwar practioners to in-
flict injury, death, and physical destruction via cyberspace strains tradi-
tional definitions of the use of force. In order to clearly delineate the 
rights of the parties involved, including the right to self-defense, the in-
ternational community must come to some consensus on the meaning of 
cyberwarfare within the existing jus ad bellum paradigm. After examining 
the shortcomings inherent in classifying cyberattacks according to classi-
cal notions of kinetic warfare, this Comment argues that international law 
should afford protection for states who initiate a good-faith response to a 
cyberattack, especially when the attack targets critical national infrastruc-
ture. 
Introduction 
 Cyberwarfare1 is a new type of weapon that has the potential to 
alter modern warfare significantly.2 Computer technology has ad-
vanced to the point where military forces now have the capability to 
                                                                                                                      
* Matthew Hoisington is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. He would like to thank Max Matthews, Kyle Robertson, Christian Westra, 
Nicole Karlebach, Alex Watson, and Matthew Ivey for their attentive editorial assistance in 
the writing of this comment. 
1 Primarily, I use the terms “cyberwarfare” or “cyberattack” in place of terms such as 
information warfare, or computer network attack. The terms are often used interchangea-
bly in the literature and for the purposes of this comment can be seen as falling under the 
same umbrella definition provided in the introduction. In his 2001 report for Congress, 
Stephen Hildreth defined cyberwarfare broadly as including defending information and 
computer networks, deterring information attacks, as well as denying an adversary’s ability 
to do the same. He also included offensive information operations mounted against an 
adversary, or even dominating information on the battlefield. See Stephen Hildreth, CRS 
Report for Congress, Cyberwarfare 16–17 (2001) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
crs/RL30735.pdf. 
2 See Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of Force, 34 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 57, 57 (2001). 
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inflict injury, death, and destruction via cyberspace.3 Cyberwarfare can 
range from relatively innocuous web vandalism to severe attacks on crit-
ical national infrastructure.4 While the temporary deactivation of gov-
ernment web pages may represent little more than a nuisance, the 
threat of misinformation spread to military commanders in the field, or 
a concerted attack on a state’s electric, water, communications, trans-
portation, or fuel networks represents a serious risk to both soldiers 
and civilians.5 The infiltration of state information networks and the 
procurement of classified data—commonly called computer espio-
nage— also fall within the spectrum of cyberwarfare, and are made eas-
ier by the increased dependence of state agencies on electronic com-
munications.6
 Despite the potential lethality of cyberwarfare, the practice cur-
rently exists in a legal netherworld.7 The highly destructive scenarios, 
as well as the potential use of cyberwar techniques in asymmetrical war-
fare, underscore the need for an unambiguous standard of conduct for 
cyberwarfare that will be universally recognized and respected.8 
Whether cyberwarfare constitutes a use of force giving rise to the right 
of self-defense therefore represents an important question in interna-
tional law.9
 Modern law on the use of force is based on article 2(4) of the 
United Nations (U.N.) Charter (Charter); however, the precise defini-
tion of what constitutes the use of force is unclear.10 Neither the Char-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Davis Brown, A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Informa-
tion Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 Harv. Int’l L. J. 179, 180 (2006). 
4 See Center for the Study of Technology and Society, Special Focus: Cyberwarfare, http:// 
web.archive.org/web/20061205020720/tecsoc.org/natsec/focuscyberwar.htm (2001). The 
authors split cyberwarfare into five general varieties. Ranging from the mildest to the most 
severe these five are: 1) web vandalism, 2) disinformation campaigns, 3) gathering secret 
data, 4) disruption in the field, and 5) attacks on critical national infrastructure. See id. Other 
commentators have defined cyberwarfare more generally as any operation that disrupts, 
denies, degrades, or destroys information resident in computers or computer networks. See 
Walter Gary Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force 132 (1999). 
5 See Special Focus, supra note 4. 
6 See id. 
7 See The Mouse that Roared, The Economist Online, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.econ- 
omist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9752625&fsrc=nwl; see also Hildreth, su-
pra note 1, at 9 (discussing the applicable legal framework regarding cyberwarfare). 
8 See Brown, supra note 3, at 180–81. 
9 See generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A 
Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self Defense, 38 Stan. J. Int’l L. 207 (2002) (emphasizing 
the importance of classifying computer network attacks on critical national infrastructure 
as a use of force giving rise to the right of self-defense). 
10 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 69–70. 
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ter nor any international body has defined the term clearly.11 Attempts 
to define cyberwarfare within the meaning of article 2(4) have strained 
traditional interpretations further.12 Analysis of the acceptability under 
the jus ad bellum, the body of international law governing the use of 
force as an instrument of national policy, of cyberwarfare centers on 
the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4), its Chapter 
VII security scheme, the inherent right to self-defense codified in arti-
cle 51, and customary international law as established by the behavior 
of states.13
 While a considerable body of international law applies to the use 
of force by states, its application to cyberspace is not always obvious and 
many questions remain surrounding precisely how international law 
relates to cyberwarfare.14 After a brief look at the history of cyberwar-
fare, this Comment initially seeks to answer a threshold question: what 
constitutes a use of force in cyberspace? Discussion addresses the re-
lated questions of what qualifies as an armed attack in cyberspace, and 
whether certain acts of cyberwarfare could constitute a per se use of 
force.15 Once the key prescriptions on the use of force are identified, 
the discussion moves to the right to use force in self-defense, and the 
circumstances when a state may legally invoke the right. Conclusions in 
the analysis include the assertion that the prevalence of cyberwarfare 
will require either an expansion of the application of the article 2(4) 
definition of the use of force or the development of new means of ad-
dressing the threat. 
                                                                                                                      
11 See id. at 70. 
12 See id. at 57; see also Raymond C. Parks & David P. Duggan, Principles of Cyber-
warfare, Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Workshop on Information Assurance and Security 
( June 5–6, 2001) (examining the differences between cyberwarfare and traditional kinetic 
warfare). 
13 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attacks and the Use of Force in Inter-
national Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 Colum. Transnat’l L. 885 (1999) 
(advocating the benefits of fitting cyberattacks within the existing use of force framework). 
14 See Sharp, supra note 4, at 7. 
15 See Office of Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International 
Legal Issues in Information Operations 15 (1999) available at http://www.au.af.mil/ 
au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf [hereinafter DoD OGC]. Read together, 
the applicable provisions of the Charter and related General Assembly resolutions provide 
a myriad of terms and concepts concerning prohibited uses of force among nations, in-
cluding the threat or use of force, acts of aggression, wars of aggression, the use of armed 
force, invasion, attack, bombardment and blockade. These acts may be directed at the 
victim nation’s territorial integrity or political independence, or against its military forces 
or marine or air fleets. They all have in common the presence of troops and the use of 
traditional military weapons. Id. The question before this Note is how they are likely to 
apply to cyberwarfare. 
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I. Background 
 Cyberattacks present an attractive option to foes of the United 
States as a form of guerilla or asymmetrical warfare.16 The specter of an 
unanticipated and massive attack on critical infrastructures that dis-
ables core functions such as telecommunications, electrical power sys-
tems, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply 
systems, government services, and emergency services has been raised 
in a number of reports on national security and by the U.S. National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), as well as other sources 
within the government.17
 In 1997, Operation Eligible Receiver was the first information war-
fare exercise in the United States to address the issue of cyberwarfare.18 
In the ninety-day exercise, thirty-five people participated on behalf of 
the rogue state using off-the-shelf technology and software.19 The sce-
nario assumed a rogue state rejecting direct military confrontation with 
the United States, seeking instead to attack vulnerable information sys-
tems.20 Some of the goals of the rogue state were to conceal the identity 
of the hackers and to delay or deny any ability by the United States to 
respond militarily.21 A number of simulated attacks were made against 
power and communications networks in nine major metropolitan ar-
eas.22 According to unclassified reports, the government and commer-
cial sites proved susceptible to attack and take-down.23
 In a 2001 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to Con-
gress, Stephen Hildreth, a national defense specialist from the Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division urged Congress to critically exam-
ine the policies, organization, and legal framework guiding executive 
branch decision-making on issues of cyberwarfare.24 Hildreth’s report 
examined broad cyberwarfare issues and their underlying questions.25 
                                                                                                                      
16 Dep’t of Def., Ann. Rep. to Cong., Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
China 13–14 (2007) available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-
Military-Power-final.pdf [hereinafter DoD Report on China]. 
17 See Michael A. Vatis, Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth 
College, Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis 17 
(2001), http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyber_a1.pdf. 
18 See Hildreth, supra note 1, at 4. 
19 See id.; Vatis, supra note 17. 
20 See Hildreth, supra note 1, at 4. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See id.; Vatis, supra note 17. 
24 See generally Hildreth (urging Congress to consider the threat seriously and articu-
lating some possible approaches). 
25 See id. at 1–2. 
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The report highlighted the pervasiveness and seriousness of the threat, 
and indicated that the risk of cyberwarfare represented an emerging 
area of national interest.26
 The real-life impact of cyberattacks became obvious in 2007 when 
Russian hackers unleashed an international cyber-assault on Estonia 
temporarily shutting down Estonian government computers, after the 
Baltic country caused offense by re-burying a Russian soldier from the 
Second World War.27 Some analysts characterized the attack as the first 
direct Russian assault on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
member.28 Again, in 2008, the Russian military sought to employ the 
weapon of cyberwarfare as a complement to its kinetic invasion of the 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of neighboring Georgia, this time 
disabling numerous government websites, including the site for the 
Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.29
 Russia is not alone in utilizing cyberwar techniques as recent re-
ports also indicate that hackers connected to the Chinese army success-
fully broke into Pentagon computers.30 Pentagon officials speculated 
that the online intruders were probably engaged in espionage, 
downloading information.31 Some claim that the attacks can be directly 
attributed to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).32 Germany’s gov-
ernment has protested to China’s rulers, saying it too was once hacked 
by the PLA.33 Given U.S. vulnerabilities, it may only be a matter of time 
before the country is faced with either a terrorist-sponsored cyberspace 
equivalent of the September 11th attacks or with a preparatory cyber 
onslaught in a situation similar to that proposed by Unrestricted War-
fare, the Chinese Military manual.34 A Pentagon report in 2007 on 
                                                                                                                      
 
26 See id. at 15. 
27 See The Mouse That Roared, supra note 7. The assault was characterized as a “denial of 
service” attack, whereby huge numbers of simulated visitors overwhelm the website. See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See John Markoff, Georgia Takes a Beating in the Cyberwar with Russia, N.Y. Times Online, 
Aug. 11, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/georgia-takes-a-beating-in-the- 
cyberwar-with-russia/?scp=1&sq=cyberwarfare&st=cse. 
30 See Stephen Fidler et al., US Concedes Danger of Cyber-attack, Financial Times Online, 
Sept. 7, 2007, at 7, http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=People%27s+Liberation+Army 
%2C+computer&aje=false&id=070905010503&ct=0. 
31 See id.; The Mouse That Roared, supra note 7. 
32 See Lewis Page, Pentagon: Chinese Military Hacked Us, The Register Online, Sept. 4, 
2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/04/china_hack_pentagon_leak/; The Mouse 
That Roared, supra note 7. 
33 See The Mouse That Roared, supra note 7. 
34 See Jensen, supra note 9, at 213; see also Daniel M. Creekman, A Helpless America? An 
Examination of the Legal Options Available to the United States in Response to Various Cyber-attacks 
from China, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 641, 670–71 (2002) (discussing the Chinese emphasis 
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China’s military force indicates that the country is developing tactics to 
achieve electromagnetic dominance early in a conflict.35 It adds that 
China, while not yet having a formal doctrine of electronic warfare, has 
begun to consider offensive cyberattacks within its operational exer-
cises,36 and is moving aggressively toward incorporating cyberwarfare 
into its military lexicon, organization, training, and doctrine.37
 To the extent that national leaders are unlikely to allow such a 
catastrophic intrusion upon their sovereignty without a response involv-
ing more than diplomatic protests, determining what legal responses 
are available represents a key inquiry into the nature and international 
legal implications of cyberwarfare.38
II. Discussion 
A. Cyberwarfare, Treaty Law, and International Norms 
 In 1999, the U.S. Department of Defense produced a document 
that examined the range of treaties and international law that might 
pertain to the conduct of cyberwarfare, supplementing the various U.S. 
laws guiding the conduct of warfare in general and U.S. government 
conduct in cyberspace.39 The assessment concluded first that the inter-
national community is unlikely to promptly produce a coherent body of 
law on the subject.40 Second, no clear legal remedies exist to address 
the type of cyberwarfare operations being considered by the United 
States.41 Third, the document recommended analyzing the various 
elements and circumstances of any particular planned operation or 
activity to determine the applicability of existing international legal 
principles.42
                                                                                                                      
on their ability to wage information warfare and the country’s open contemplation of the 
development of a fourth branch of the armed services dedicated to information warfare). 
35 See The Mouse That Roared, supra note 7. See generally Dod Report on China, supra 
note 16 (outlining the different capabilities of the Chinese military and the general Chi-
nese approach to foreign policy). 
36 See Dod Report on China, supra note 16, at 16; The Mouse That Roared, supra note 7. 
37 See Hildreth, supra note 1, at 12; Creekman, supra note 34, at 652–53 & 670–71. 
38 See Jensen, supra note 9, at 213–14. 
39 See Hildreth, supra note 1, at 9. See generally DoD OGC, supra note 15 (examining 
the legal landscape regarding cyberwarfare). 
40 See DoD OGC, supra note 15, at 50; Hildreth, supra note 1, at 9. 
41 See Hildreth, supra note 1, at 9 
42 See DoD OGC, supra note 15, at 50; Hildreth, supra note 1, at 9. 
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 A number of existing international treaties suggest norms which 
could ultimately be used to regulate cyberwarfare.43 The International 
Telecommunications Convention (ITC), for instance, prohibits harm-
ful interference with telecommunications.44 While the effectiveness of 
the treaty is limited by its state security exception, the creation of a 
norm analogizing network space to airspace could prove vital to the 
development of international law in cyberspace.45 Of course, a violation 
of the ITC does not constitute a per se use of force within the meaning 
of article 2(4) of the Charter and therefore does not necessarily gener-
ate the same opposition within the international community as other 
clear-cut acts of aggression.46
 Another potentially relevant international legal document is the 
Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, signed 
by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989. This treaty prohibits 
harmful interference with enemy command and control systems, there-
fore suggesting a possible emergent norm that could designate cyber-
warfare attacks as a use of force.47
 In the 1990s as the concept of cyberwarfare first began to receive 
widespread attention from the media, there were some efforts within 
the international community to negotiate an agreement.48 Russia ta-
bled a resolution in the U.N.’s First Committee in October 1998 in an 
apparent effort to get the U.N. to focus on the subject.49 The resolution 
included a call for states to support their views regarding the advisabil-
ity of elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, 
production, and use of particularly dangerous information weapons.50 
The initiative, however, found little support among the international 
community, and was never submitted to the General Assembly for a 
plenary vote.51
 As a result of the failure of the international community to produce 
a directly applicable international agreement key legal issues regarding 
cyberwarfare remain unresolved.52 These include, for example, the 
need for standards informing the expeditious pursuit of those violating 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 95. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. at 95–96. 
46 See id. at 96. 
47 See id. 
48 See DoD OGC, supra note 15, at 49. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 96–97. 
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the law, law enforcement needs in the conduct of electronic surveillance 
of those launching cyberattacks, and the establishment of clear and ap-
propriate rules of engagement for cyber defense activities.53
B. Cyberwarfare and International Law on the Use of Force 
 Any number of purposes might motivate a state to conduct cyber-
warfare and regardless of the aim the normative evaluation by the in-
ternational community will center on whether the cyberattacks, both 
offensive and retaliatory, constituted a wrongful use of force, or threat 
thereof, in violation of international law.54 In order to define cyberwar-
fare effectively, the international community must come to some con-
sensus on the meaning of such activities within the penumbra of the 
Charter, specifically article 2(4) regulating the use of force, and article 
51, which outlines the right of self-defense.55
 Article 2(4) of the Charter expresses the key prescription in inter-
national law regarding the use of force.56 The provision states that 
“[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”57 Given this analytical framework, the 
dispositive question is whether an act constitutes a use of force.58 The 
Charter clearly outlaws the aggressive use of force, while recognizing a 
state’s inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in article 
51.59 Accordingly, if a state activity constitutes a use of force within the 
meaning of article 2(4), it is unlawful unless it is an exercise of that 
state’s inherent right of self-defense.60
                                                                                                                      
53 See id. 
54 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 900. 
55 See Creekman, supra note 34, at 679. See generally Sharp, supra note 4 (articulating an 
approach that defines acts of cyberwarfare within the existing jus ad bellum). 
56 See id. 
57 U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
58 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 904. 
59 See Sharp, supra note 4, at 33. 
60 See id. at 33–34. In addition to the inherent right of self-defense codified under arti-
cle 51, under article 39 the Security Council has the obligation to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace. Therefore, articles 2(4), 39, and 51 must be read together to determine 
the scope and content of the Charter’s prohibition on the aggressive use of force, the re-
sponsibility of the Security Council to enforce this prohibition, and the right of all states to 
use force in self-defense. For the purposes of this paper, discussion of article 39 has been 
omitted; however, Sharp articulates the relevance of article 39 eloquently in his book. See 
id. at 27–54. 
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 While the precise definition of what constitutes the use of force is 
unclear, some of the parameters are well-defined.61 For instance, con-
ventional weapons attacks are included within the article 2(4) defini-
tion.62 Furthermore, cyberattacks intended to directly cause physical 
damage to tangible property or injury or death to human beings are 
reasonably characterized as a use of armed force and, therefore, en-
compassed in the prohibition.63 Conversely, despite attempts by devel-
oping states to include economic coercion within article 2(4) during 
the drafting of the Charter, such practices have been expressly ex-
cluded.64 Thus, analysis based on either the text of article 2(4) or the 
history underlying its adoption requires an interpretation excluding 
economic, and for that matter political, coercion from the article’s pre-
scriptive sphere.65
 The potential application of article 2(4) to cyberwarfare creates 
serious interpretive difficulties for the existing distinction between 
force and coercion.66 Including all cyberwarfare actions within the 
definition of use of force would require a major expansion of article 
2(4).67 Such an expanded definition of the use of force would make it 
very difficult to continue to exclude acts of coercion from article 2(4) 
because international law would have to distinguish cyberattacks that 
do not cause physical damage, such as electronic incursions and block-
ades, from acts of economic and political coercion, such as economic 
sanctions, which traditionally and specifically have been excluded from 
article 2(4), but which may often have the same effect.68 The dilemma 
lies in classifying cyberattacks that do not cause physical damage, or do 
so indirectly, vis-á-vis the prohibition on the use of force.69
                                                                                                                      
61 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 70. 
62 See id.; Schmitt, supra note 13, at 904. 
63 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 913. 
64 See Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for 
Law in all the Wrong Places?, 51 Naval L. Rev. 132, 134–35 (2005); Barkham, supra note 2, 
at 70–71. Defining cyberattacks on economic centers of gravity as use of force under the 
current international regimes has grave potential for unintended and undesirable legal 
consequences. Incorporating cyberattacks on critical economic infrastructures into the 
definition of use of force cannot be done with sufficient precision to exclude other state 
economic policies which have long been defended as necessary tools of foreign policy, and 
deliberately excluded from the international definition of the use of force, particularly by 
market based democracies. See Antolin-Jenkins, supra. 
65 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 905. 
66 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 84. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 84–85. 
69 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 913. 
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 In an attempt to solve this classification impasse, Michael Schmitt 
delimits economic and political coercion from the use of armed force 
by reference to six criteria: 1) severity, 2) immediacy, 3) directness, 
4) invasiveness, 5) measurability, and 6) presumptive legitimacy.70 
Through this scheme, the consequences of the act of cyberwarfare are 
measured against commonalities to ascertain whether they more closely 
approximate consequences of the sort characterizing armed force or 
whether they are better placed outside the use of force boundary.71 Ac-
cording to Schmitt, this technique allows the force “box” to expand to 
fill gaps resulting from the emergence of coercive possibilities enabled 
by technological advances without altering the balance of the current 
framework.72 Instead, the expansion of the use of force definition is 
cast in terms of the underlying factors driving the existing classifica-
tions.73
 Applying Schmitt’s technique, in determining whether an a cyber-
attack falls within the more flexible consequence-based understanding 
of force, the nature of the act’s reasonably foreseeable consequences 
are assessed to determine whether they resemble those of an armed 
attack.74 If the consequences resemble those of an armed attack, exten-
sion of the use of force prohibition to the act is justified.75 If not, 
wrongfulness under international law would have to be determined by 
resort to prescriptions other than those prohibiting force.76
 An even less onerous, purely result-oriented test represents an-
other potential framework for determining whether specific acts of cy-
berwarfare constitute a use of force.77 Under the strict results-oriented 
approach no difference exists between an attacker firing a missile at a 
target or using a computer to remotely cause physical damage.78 If a 
cyberattack achieves the same result that could have been achieved with 
bombs or bullets, it will be treated the same under international law 
governing the use of force.79 The problem with the result-oriented ap-
                                                                                                                      
70 See id. at 915. 
71 See id.; Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 64, at 170. 
72 See Schmitt, supra note 13, at 915. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 915–16. 
75 See id. at 916. 
76 See id.; see also Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 64, at 170 (recognizing the gray areas that 
result from the consequence based approach, as opposed to the bright line rules provided 
by an instrument-based analysis). 
77 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 86. 
78 See Brown, supra note 3, at 187. 
79 See id. 
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proach to cyberattacks is that it blurs the distinction excluding eco-
nomic coercion from the traditional use of force classification charac-
terized by armed attacks, since economic coercion could also serve as 
the proximate cause of disruptive or destructive effects.80
C. Cyberwarfare and the Self-Defense Exception 
 Under the Charter, there are two exceptions to the prohibition on 
the use of force: Security Council action pursuant to article 42, and in-
dividual or collective self-defense under article 51.81 Legal scholars dis-
agree on the current state of customary international law as it relates to 
the use of force in self-defense and the proper interpretation of article 
51.82 Article 51 of the Charter states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Se-
curity Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council 
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it 
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.83
The scope of article 51 represents the subject of considerable contro-
versy among international legal scholars.84 Some scholars interpret ar-
ticle 51 strictly, arguing that a state may not act in self-defense until that 
state has suffered an armed attack.85 According to this reading, a state 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 86. 
81 See Sean M. Condron, Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cy-
berspace, 20 Harv. J. L. Tech. 403, 413 (2007). Article 42 of the U.N. Charter states, 
“Should the Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inade-
quate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. See U.N. Charter 
arts. 41–42. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
air, sea, or land forces of the Members of the United Nations.” Id. 
82 See Condron, supra note 81. 
83 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
84 See Barkham, supra note 2, at 74; Condron, supra note 81, at 412–13. 
85 See Condron, supra note 81, at 412; see also Barkham, supra note 2, at 74–75 (de-
scribing the Security Council view of article 51 as restrictive, declining to approve of ac-
tions taken that were not in specific response to an armed attack). 
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could not act in anticipation of an armed attack.86 Nevertheless, a great 
many states take the counter-restrictionist view and support the propo-
sition that in certain circumstances it may be lawful to use force in ad-
vance of an actual armed attack.87 Legal scholars supporting the latter 
stance argue that article 51 incorporates customary international law as 
articulated by the Caroline standard, allowing anticipatory self-
defense.88 As defined by then Secretary of State, Daniel Webster in the 
Caroline case, this point in time occurs when the “necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and 
no moment for deliberation.”89
 Under the jus ad bellum paradigm, a state response to an armed 
attack must meet three conditions to qualify as self-defense: necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy.90 To fulfill the principle of necessity 
the state must attribute the attack to a specific source, characterize the 
intent behind the attack, and conclude that the state must use force in 
response.91 The principle of proportionality requires that the force 
used in the response be proportional to the original attack.92 The re-
quirement of immediacy prohibits a response from occurring after too 
much time has passed.93 With regard to immediacy as a general crite-
rion, however, no requirement exists for defensive action to be exer-
cised (or risk forfeiture), immediately following an armed attack.94
                                                                                                                      
86 See Condron, supra note 81, at 412. 
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 Attribution and characterization are especially important in con-
text of cyberwarfare.95 Generally, the international law of self-defense 
does not justify acts of active defense across international borders un-
less the provocation can be attributed to an agent of the nation con-
cerned.96 Given the opportunities cyberspace creates for the remote 
commission of attacks and attacker anonymity, perpetrators of cyberat-
tacks are likely to go unidentified.97 Attribution helps to ensure that a 
state does not target an innocent person or place.98 Furthermore, a 
state must attribute an attack because the laws governing a permissible 
response vary depending on whether the attacker is a state actor or a 
non-state actor.99 The article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force gen-
erally applies only to states and not to individuals.100 States, therefore, 
are prevented under international law from threatening or using force 
against each other, while similar acts by individuals fall under the prov-
ince of domestic criminal laws.101
 While it is difficult to discover the identity of the attacker, identify-
ing his or her intent in time to take preventive action represents an 
equally problematic and potentially more important task.102 In order to 
respond with force, a victim state must first identify the attacker’s inten-
tions as hostile.103 Unlike conventional kinetic warfare, the instantane-
ous nature of a cyberattack deprives the victim state of the opportunity 
to preemptively contemplate a response.104 As a solution, Walter Gary 
Sharp has proposed that all states should adopt a rule of engagement 
that allows them to use force in anticipatory self-defense against any 
identified state that demonstrates hostile intent by penetrating a com-
puter system which is critical to their respective vital national inter-
ests.105
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452 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:439 
III. Analysis 
 Existing attempts at defining cyberwarfare within the current jus 
ad bellum paradigm fail to offer adequate safeguards from cyberat-
tacks.106 The technology inherent in cyberwarfare makes it nearly im-
possible to attribute the attack to a specific source or to characterize the 
intent behind it.107 Furthermore, acts of cyberwarfare occur almost si-
multaneously.108 A legal system that requires a determination of the 
attacker’s identity and intent does not account for these features of the 
digital age.109 The current international paradigm therefore limits the 
options available to states, making it difficult to effectively respond 
without risking a violation of international law.110 Restraining a state’s 
ability to respond will encourage rogue nations, terrorist organizations, 
and individuals to commit increasingly severe cyberattacks.111
 Serious flaws exist in Michael Schmitt’s consequence-based frame-
work for analyzing cyberwarfare under article 2(4).112 By using pre-
sumptive legitimacy as a factor, Schmitt’s approach requires determin-
ing the legitimacy of an attack under international law by asking 
whether the attack is legitimate.113 In effect, the approach is back-
wards.114 Furthermore, unlike other types of warfare, instances of cy-
berwarfare cannot be assessed readily at the time of the attack to de-
termine their magnitude and the permitted responses.115 This problem 
will arise with any framework that requires an ex post analysis, including 
the aforementioned results-oriented approach.116
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 To address the unique nature of cyberwarfare, international law 
should afford protection for states who initiate a good-faith response to 
an attack, thus acting in cyber self-defense, without first attributing and 
characterizing the attack.117 State survival may depend on an immedi-
ate, robust, and aggressive response; therefore international law should 
not impose an inflexible requirement on states to fully satisfy the tradi-
tional necessity requirements when acting in self-defense of vital state 
interests.118 The law should evolve to recognize a state’s inherent right 
to self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, in response to a cy-
berattack, especially when the attack targets critical national infrastruc-
ture.119
 Allowing a state to exercise active defense measures in response to 
an attack on critical national infrastructure, without incurring liability, 
represents a preferable governing principle to the treatment of cyber-
warfare under the existing jus ad bellum paradigm.120 In order to de-
lineate this exception to the usual rule governing the use of force, the 
international community should promulgate a list of critical national 
infrastructure that a state may protect with active defense measures.121 
If the critical infrastructure identified on the list were subjected to a 
cyberattack, a state could respond in presumptively good-faith self-
defense without first attributing or characterizing the attack to the level 
of specificity required under the traditional formulation.122 Such an 
exception would not fundamentally alter the jus ad bellum framework, 
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but would instead allow the state to exercise its inherent right of self-
defense in response to a novel threat.123
Conclusion 
 The U.N. Charter was written before the internet existed and, 
therefore, cyberwarfare presents a unique challenge to traditional 
definitions of what constitutes a use of force. Despite this difficulty, the 
serious and pervasiveness of the threat demand that the international 
community come to a consensus on both the meaning of cyberwarfare 
within the jus ad bellum paradigm, and the options available to states 
subjected to cyberattack. Serious threats to international peace will re-
sult unless states have the ability to respond in self-defense to cyberat-
tacks without being restrained by outdated interpretations of interna-
tional law governing the use of force. 
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